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Introduction and abstract 
 
Following a dramatic surge in financial investment in commodity derivatives markets by institutional 
investors, hedge funds and large investment banks, agricultural commodity prices started to 
fluctuate together in an unprecedented fashion. In June 2008 all main agricultural prices peaked at 
their highest level in 30 years, and then fell sharply in the next six months. In 2010 there was a 
new steep rise, with prices peaking in early 2011 at levels higher than those reached in 2008. A 
worldwide debate has erupted over the role of financial speculation in driving these price dynamics. 
 
The hypothesis put forward by several observers goes as follows: during the last decade financial 
investors significantly increased their investment in commodity futures markets, influencing the 
formation of futures prices, which are the benchmark for spot prices. In particular, financial actors 
had been buying large amounts of futures contracts between 2004 and 2008, putting a huge 
upwards pressure on prices. Then they temporarily exited those markets between late 2008 and 
early 2009, selling the contracts they held and causing the fall in prices. They started being bullish 
again from mid-2009, triggering the new price peak of 2010/2011. If this hypothesis holds true, 
then the policy implication is that new regulatory measures are needed in order to curb excessive 
speculation on commodity derivatives markets. 
 
Although this theory seems convincing, the underlying evidence is still not clear-cut. Some 
empirical results have been presented (for example by Gilbert, 2009; Tang and Xiong, 2010; 
Buyuksahin and Robe, 2010) which suggest that financial speculation affected recent agricultural 
commodity price dynamics, but conclusive evidence is still to be found. In my view this is due to a 
lack of appropriate statistical information about commodity derivatives markets (as explained later 
on). 
 
In this essay I give a short descriptive overview of recent agricultural price dynamics (Section 1), 
present some reflections on the recent boom cycle of commodity derivatives markets, with a 
special focus on agricultural commodities, (Section 2) and discuss the empirical literature that tries 
to assess whether financial investors have affected agricultural commodity price dynamics in 
recent years (Section 3). 
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1. Recent agricultural price dynamics in brief 
 
A long phase of stability and moderation in international agricultural prices, which started in the 
early Eighties, ended abruptly in the second half of the last decade. Crop prices began to rise 
sharply in 2007, and by June 2008 they had reached their highest level in thirty years. The 
subsequent reversal was even faster, with prices falling by around 40% in six months (between 
July 2008 and January 2009). A new surge has been observed since spring 2010, with prices 
peaking in early 2011 at levels slightly higher than those reached in 2008. Since mid-2011, prices 
appear to have been declining again. 
 
Table 1. International prices, main agricultural commodities and oil (% change) 
 
2002-2006 June ‘08/Jan ‘07 Dec ‘08/June ‘08 June  ‘11/Dec ‘08 Dec ‘11/June ‘11 
Wheat 63% 78% -37% 48% -18% 
Corn 75% 75% -45% 96% -17% 
Rice 62% 166% -34% -6% 12% 
Soybeans 52% 116% -42% 57% -16% 
Oil* 219% 146% -69% 157% -2% 
* Average petroleum spot price. Average of UK Brent, Dubai and WTI, equally weighted 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on IMF data 
 
 
 
Figure 1. International agricultural commodity prices: wheat, maize, rice and soybeans 
Source: Our own elaboration on IMF data 
 
These price swings were shared not only by agricultural commodities, but also by energy and 
metal commodities. They don‟t appear fundamental-driven, since offer and demand were not (and 
probably cannot be) so volatile in the short term. Even if during the 2000s an overall cereal 
production deficit was observed in six years out of ten, if we stick to the data made available by the 
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FAO and the USDA, physical market fundamentals don‟t appear to justify the steep price increases 
of 2007/2008 and 2010/2011, nor the late 2008 slump. In these years there was no particular 
consumption peak, nor a significant fall in production. Indeed, main exporters‟ stocks didn‟t show a 
clear downward trend (see Figure 3). Cereals‟ stocks declined between 2006 and 2008, but not so 
steeply to fully justify the dramatic rise in prices; indeed, in 2008 cereals‟ stocks were broadly at 
the same level as in 2003. 
 
It is widely debated whether these price dynamics were influenced by the huge inflow of financial 
investments on commodity derivatives which was observed since the second half of the 2000s.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Agricultural, energy and metal commodity prices on international markets (2005 =100) 
Source: Own elaboration on IMF (Primary Commodity Prices Database) data. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Major exporters‟ stock-to-disappearance ratio2 
Source: Own elaboration on FAO estimates (FAO, 2011).  
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2. The boom cycle of commodity derivatives markets 
 
2.1 A ‘wall of money’ flowing into commodities 
 
Commodity derivatives markets experienced a remarkable growth during the second half of the last 
decade, which involved both centralized exchanges and over-the-counter (OTC) transactions. 
Rocketing transaction volumes and open interest3 resulted from a huge inflow of financial 
speculative investments, coming from investment banks, pension funds, hedge funds and other 
institutional investors. As some market analysts put it, during the 2000s financial investors flooded 
commodity futures and options markets with a “wall of money”. This was part of a larger shift in 
portfolio strategy, which drove financial institutions away from traditional equity markets towards 
commodity and real estate derivatives (Basu and Gavin, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 4 – Notional amounts outstanding of OTC derivatives (billions of US dollars) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on B.I.S. data 
 
 
Figure 5 – Commodity futures contracts traded on organized exchanges (millions of contracts) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration on B.I.S. data  
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It is helpful to outline a brief timeline. During the Nineties some financial investors, mainly hedge 
funds (Basu and Gavin, 2011) started investing in commodities4. But it was after 2004-2005 that 
the phenomenon took new and greater dimensions. Considerable amounts of capital were moved 
away from traditional equity markets towards commodities and (above all) US real estate 
derivatives markets.  
 
In 2006/2007, US house prices started to decline, marking the beginning of the US real estate and 
mortgage market collapse. Consequently, financial investors started to turn away from these 
markets, and many of them diverted their capital into commodities. In 2007 and early 2008 there 
was a peak in commodity derivatives trading, and at the same time in the price of all main 
commodities.  
 
Between 2004 and 2008 the notional amount5 of commodity derivatives traded OTC (Figure 4) 
grew by an impressive 900%, while the number of contracts traded in organized exchanges (Figure 
5) increased by a no less remarkable 214%. In late 2008 there was a fall in commodity derivatives 
trading, both OTC and centralized, as financial institutions were selling their assets in an attempt to 
get liquid and cover losses during the financial crisis. The slump was reversed in late 2009, when a 
new surge of financial investments in commodities began. The number of futures contracts traded 
in commodity exchanges fell by 20% between March and December 2008. The number then 
started rising again and by summer 2010 it had reached a new high, 71 percentage points higher 
than the previous peak of spring 2008. A new declining trend seems to have started in late 2011. 
Notional amounts of over-the-counter transactions reached their peak in spring 2008 and then fell 
by 67% during the following six months. Until now, they have remained well below the 2008 peak.  
 
In conclusion, we can distinguish an initial commodity derivatives boom cycle (2007-2008) and a 
second one (2010-2011). The first cycle was characterized by an increase in OTC transactions 
higher than that in contracts traded in centralized exchanges, while in the second cycle it was the 
growth of exchange-traded derivatives that was more relevant6. This shift could be explained by a 
perceived increase in counterparty risks that made OTC instruments less appealing, and/or by the 
development of new financial instruments as ETPs (exchange traded products), which operate in 
centralized exchanges (Borin and Di Nino, 2012). In both cases the boom in commodity derivatives 
trading coincided with a peak in international commodity prices.  
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history (Kindleberger, 1978), but here we are focusing on a relatively short time-span, when financial institutions re-discovered the 
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5
 According to the B.I.S., “Nominal or notional amounts outstanding are defined as the gross nominal or notional value of all deals 
concluded and not yet settled on the reporting date.”(Bank for International Settlements, 2011) 
 
6
 We can infer this distinction from B.I.S. data (see figures 4 and 5) even though they are not completely comparable, because the 
notional amounts of contracts traded OTC is influenced not only by the number of contracts traded but also by the price fluctuations of 
the underlying commodity. 
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These events were allowed to happen by a process of deregulation of US commodity futures 
markets, the main steps of which were the exemption of some financial actors from speculative 
position limits (starting in 1991), and the deregulation of OTC markets (with the Commodity 
Exchange Modernization Act of 2000). 
 
Besides the vicissitudes of financial market developments and the process of deregulation, we can 
recognize three other main factors at the root of the new appeal of commodities as an asset class. 
Low interest rates set by the Federal Reserve pushed up the demand for any risky asset, as the 
lower cost of credit caused risk premiums to decrease. Moreover - and no less decisive - there was 
a widespread (and not completely groundless) belief that a new commodity super-cycle had just 
started, sustained by the growth in emerging countries. Last but not least, some influential studies 
– market analyses by financial firms and also academic papers - claimed that not only commodities 
were a profitable investment, but that they even represented a hedge against the economic cycle 
(see for example Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2004 and Goldman Sachs, 2004). 
 
 
2.2. The actors in commodity futures markets 
 
We can distinguish three main types of actors in commodity derivatives markets, depending on the 
aims and strategies they exhibit. Commercial operators trade commodity derivatives in order to 
hedge their transactions on the spot market, while financial investors are motivated by the search 
for yields and/or by portfolio diversification strategies. Financial investors operating in commodity 
markets can be divided into two categories, which we call commodity index traders and money 
managers. Commodity index traders are passive agents whose aim is to gain exposure to 
commodities as an asset class. They do so by tracking a commodity index, which is a weighted 
average of different commodity prices, with fixed weights (mainly) dependent on world production 
and updated once a year. To invest in commodity indices, investors buy financial instruments 
whose value is proportional to the value of the indices. These instruments – swap agreements, 
ETFs and ETNs – are typically offered by large financial institutions. These institutions buy 
commodity futures contracts in order to hedge their commitment with their clients. By contrast, we 
term „money managers‟ any financial investors who don‟t track a commodity index, but instead 
actively buy and sell futures contracts in an attempt to anticipate price changes.  
 
These categories are to be seen as dynamic rather than static. In real futures markets, there is no 
clear-cut distinction between hedging and speculation. Rather, there is a continuum between pure 
hedging and speculation. Often big commercial operators carry out speculative operations; at the 
same time, complex speculative strategies followed by financial institutions can sometimes bring 
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the latter to trade on physical markets. Furthermore, there are cases in which the same trader runs 
multiple lines of business, blurring the distinction between index traders and money managers. 
 
 
2.3. Agricultural commodities and financialization 
 
During the last decade, the remarkable influx of financial speculative investment has drastically 
changed the composition of commodity futures markets. Fairly reliable data about trading volumes 
and net positions of each category of traders are only available for U.S. centralized exchanges and 
only for the 2006-2011 period.7 However, the growth in commodity derivatives trading was so 
steep that only speculative investments could have triggered it, because physical production did 
not grow at similar rates; so the huge new demand for futures contracts can‟t have come from 
commercial operators trying to hedge their physical markets‟ operations. Better Markets, a 
nonprofit organization, roughly calculated that in the period 2005-2008 commodity index funds 
alone pumped as much as 300 billion dollars into US commodity futures markets, and that the 
market share of financial speculators in the Chicago Board Of Trade wheat futures market rose 
from 12% of the market in 1996 to 65% in 2008, with the hedging of producers and purchasers 
dropping to 35%.  
 
The composition of the futures market is important because it determines the relative importance of 
the different factors that affect futures prices. Money managers‟ demand for commodity futures 
contracts is a function of their own expectations about the future fluctuations of prices and of the 
present and future returns of the other financial markets in which they operate, while commercial 
hedgers‟ demand is a function of physical production and consumption of the commodity. Index 
traders‟ demand depends on their own expectations about the future returns of the commodity 
index they are tracking, and on the present and future fluctuations of the other financial markets in 
which they operate. That is why a futures market dominated by financial speculators can 
disconnect prices from physical market fundamentals, linking them instead to financial investors‟ 
expectations about their own collective behavior (the “beauty contest” described by Keynes, 1936) 
and to other financial markets‟ dynamics. 
 
According to the data made available by the US market authority (CFTC), in the period 2006-2011 
financial speculators held on average a market share of more than 50% in all main US agricultural 
exchanges (see Table 3 and Figure 6). The large majority of this financial investment came from 
commodity index funds. At first glance this could seem counter-intuitive, given that agricultural 
commodities are present in commodity indices with only small weightings. Indeed, it is energy 
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commodities and in particular crude oil that lead the indices and consequently attract the greatest 
part of the financial inflow. But we have to consider that (1) commodity index funds‟ total 
investment has been so huge that even a small fraction of it corresponds to a great amount of 
capital; (2) agricultural futures markets are less liquid than energy futures markets, so they are less 
able to absorb capital inflows; (3) commodity index traders follow a strategy of buying futures 
contracts and then holding them for a long time, substituting each near-maturity contract with the 
next; this means that they take almost only long positions, in such a way that their net position on 
the market is always positive, and almost as high as their trading volume (while money managers‟ 
net position is significantly lower than their trading volume, because opposite bets offset each 
other).  
 
 
2.4. The relation between spot and futures prices 
 
The strong connection between spot prices and futures prices means that the impact of index 
traders‟ investment was felt not only by commercial hedgers operating on commodity futures 
markets, but also by food consumers around the world. Spot and futures prices are linked by 
arbitrage links, by the price discovery function and by the hedging activity of producers and 
purchasers. No-arbitrage implies that the futures price equals the spot price augmented by the cost 
of carry8 and diminished by the convenience yield.9 But we do not necessarily need to assume no-
arbitrage to state that there is a strong link between spot and futures prices. Futures markets were 
created in order to let commercial traders hedge their physical transactions (the “hedging function”) 
and to discover a price to be used as a benchmark for spot prices (the “price discovery function”). 
The „hedging function‟ implies that for commercial operators the futures price is the price that they 
will actually receive (or pay) for their physical transactions, as long as they hedged those 
transactions on the futures market. The “price discovery function” implies that futures prices are 
used as a benchmark for spot prices. This is confirmed by empirical analysis. In particular, 
Hernandez and Torero (2010) showed that futures and spot prices of main agricultural 
commodities are highly correlated, and that changes in futures prices tend to lead changes in spot 
prices.  
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Table 2 – Commodity futures markets – Actors and instruments 
 
COMMERCIAL HEDGERS 
SPECULATORS 
 
MONEY MANAGERS  COMMODITY INDEX 
TRADERS 
 
Who they 
are 
 
Physical market operators (big 
producers, elevators, large scale 
purchasers) 
 
Individual investors or 
investment funds (e.g. hedge 
funds). 
 
 
Big investment banks which sell 
Commodity Index Funds to their 
clients 
Aims 
 
Minimize risks linked to price 
variations, to which they are 
exposed because of their 
commercial operations on the 
physical markets. 
 
 
 
 
Profit from future price 
changes 
 
To hedge their commitment with 
their clients, to whom they pay a 
cash flow linked to the returns of 
the commodity index. 
 
Net 
aggregate 
position on 
the futures 
market 
 
Their aggregate net position is 
traditionally negative, because 
they are mainly big producers 
and elevators (even some big 
purchasers trade futures 
contracts, albeit on a minor 
scale). 
 
 
Usually not so ample 
compared to their trading 
volume. Its sign change 
depends on expectations about 
future price changes. 
 
 
Necessarily positive and almost 
equal to their trading volume. In 
other words, they tend to take 
only long positions. 
Demand 
function 
 
Their demand for futures 
contracts is a function of 
physical market fundamentals 
(demand and supply of the 
physical commodity). 
 
 
Their demand for futures 
contracts is a function of their 
expectations about the future 
price movements and the 
returns of the other financial 
markets in which they invest. 
 
 
Inelastic to the price of each 
single commodity in which they 
invest, their demand is sensitive to 
the returns of the tracked 
commodity index and to the 
returns of other financial markets. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table 3 – Futures market structure, 2006-2011 
(Millions of contracts) 
Wheat Futures – Chicago Board of Trade 
 Volume % Long % Short % Net % 
Commercial Hedgers 84.9 31% 20.7 18% 64.3 58% -43.6 38% 
Money Managers 83.0 31% 16.6 14% 24.2 22% -7.6 7% 
Index Traders 72.8 27% 65.6 57% 7.2 6% 58.3 51% 
Non Reported 30.8 11% 11.9 10% 15.8 14% -3.9 3% 
Total 271.5 100% 114.7 100% 111.5 100% - - 
  Wheat Futures – Kansas City Board of Trade 
 Volume % Long % Short % Net % 
Commercial Hedgers 37.0 43% 10.9 29% 26.1 65% -15.1 47% 
Money Managers 21.2 25% 9.1 24% 3.7 9% 5.4 17% 
Index Traders 11.2 13% 10.6 28% 0.9 2% 9.7 30% 
Non Reported 16.5 19% 7.3 19% 9.2 23% -1.9 6% 
Total 85.9 100% 37.9 100% 39.9 100% - - 
 Corn Futures- Chicago Board of Trade  
 Volume % Long % Short % Net % 
Commercial Hedgers 363.3 41% 117.2 31% 246.1 65% -128.9 40% 
Money Managers 235.4 27% 74.4 20% 31.2 8% 43.2 13% 
Index Traders 143.5 16% 130.5 34% 13.0 3% 117.5 37% 
Non Reported 145.0 16% 56.6 15% 88.4 23% -31.8 10% 
Total 887.2 100% 378.7 100% 378.7 100% - - 
Soybeans Futures – Chicago Board of Trade 
 Volume % Long % Short % Net % 
Commercial Hedgers 129.4 39% 38.8 28% 90.6 65% -51.8 41% 
Money Managers 100.7 30% 28.8 21% 13.3 10% 15.5 12% 
Index Traders 55.8 17% 53.0 38% 4.7 3% 48.3 38% 
Non Reported 49.5 15% 19.7 14% 29.9 22% -10.2 8% 
Total 335.5 100% 140.3 100% 138.4 100% - - 
 
Source: Our own elaboration on CFTC data 
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Commercial Hedgers  Index Traders 
 
 Non reported 
 
 Money Managers 
 
Figure 6 – Futures market composition (net positions %), 2006-201110 
Source: Own elaboration and calculations based on CFTC (Commitments of Traders supplemental report) data. 
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3. Empirical evidence 
 
Several studies aim to assess the impact of financial investment on commodity prices. Some of 
them test whether changes in commodity futures prices have tended to be anticipated by changes 
in financial investors‟ positions on commodity exchanges (see Hamilton and Wu, 2012, pp.2-5, for 
a brief review of these studies). In other words, these empirical studies test whether financial 
investments „Granger-cause‟ commodity price dynamics. Overall, the results of these studies are 
mostly negative or inconclusive (Singleton, 2011 is a significant exception regarding the crude oil 
market). In particular, Borin and Di Nino (2012) focus on agricultural commodities. Through a VAR 
specification, they find no clear evidence that the movements of financial investors help to predict 
future price changes, while in half of the eleven agricultural markets they examine higher futures 
returns tend to be followed by an increase in money managers‟ investment (which could suggest 
the presence of some kind of herding-behavior). They also find no systematic relationship between 
financial investment and price volatility11.  
 
In my view, the evidence provided by these works is far from conclusive, mainly because of crucial 
flaws in the available data on investors‟ net positions. Data are available only for US commodity 
exchanges, so OTC markets and non-US commodity exchanges are not taken into account - see 
Figures 4 and 5. But it seems likely that trading OTC and in foreign markets do influence price 
formation in US exchanges, because of arbitrage connections. Moreover, data are available only 
since 200612. Another critical issue is that these studies only analyze weekly returns, because daily 
data on the positions of traders are not available. This could result in a huge loss of information, 
since futures markets can display significant short-term movements (which is why empirical 
analysis of financial returns is traditionally based on daily-frequency data).  
 
An alternative strategy is the one used by Gilbert (2009), which tested several commodities‟ price 
dynamics in order to find evidence of speculative bubbles caused by feedback trading or by index 
trading. Only in a few commodity markets – in particular soybean and copper – did his model point 
to a speculative bubble caused by extrapolative expectations, while in many he finds evidence of a 
bubble caused by index traders. 
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 Overall, money managers‟ investment seems to be followed by a decrease in volatility in some markets, while “the evidence on swap 
dealers is more mixed and their investments seem to amplify price volatility in some markets” (Borin and Di Nino, 2012) 
 
12
 Before 2006 index traders were not recognized as a category of traders per se. Many of them where classified as „hedgers‟ and some 
other as „non-commercial‟, thus making CFTC data not usable for the kind of analysis that we are discussing here. Further flaws in 
these data are the following: the classification of a trader as an index-trader is largely based on an assessment of his activity in early 
2007 (the first time the report was released) and not updated; if a trader has several business lines, the CIT report does not separate his 
position for different trading purposes and instead treats his aggregate positions under his classified category (Tang and Xiong, 2010, 
p.10). 
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A further approach is to test whether financial actors have influenced commodity price variations by 
linking them to financial market dynamics and by increasing the connections between different 
commodity markets. This strategy has been followed by some recent empirical studies, perhaps as 
a reaction to the impossibility of finding conclusive results using the more direct „Granger-
causality‟-approach. These works move from the fact that since the late 2000s commodity prices 
have become positively and significantly related to stock market returns and to one another. This is 
clearly shown in Figures 7 and 8, which depict the time pattern of the correlation of agricultural 
commodities with stock market returns and the price of oil.  
 
Buyuksahin and Robe (2010), using non-public data from the US Market Authority (CFTC), find 
that the correlations between the returns of investable commodities and equity indices increase 
amid greater participation by hedge funds (and not by commodity index funds). Tang and Xiong 
(2010), on the other hand, find that since the early 2000s futures prices of non-energy commodities 
in the US became increasingly correlated with oil, and that this trend is systematically more 
pronounced for commodities included in the two most popular commodity indices.  
 
In a yet unpublished paper (Girardi, 2012b)13, I examine the correlation of agricultural commodity 
prices with stock market indices and oil prices by means of a Garch specification. I find the 
significance of these correlations to be robust to the introduction of some control variables (namely 
auto-correlation coefficients, the US dollar exchange rate fluctuations, a dummy accounting for the 
global recession and the price of gasoline), but to disappear when we control for the commodity 
index S&P-GSCI, the most tracked by commodity index funds. In other words, I find that 
conditional on the S&P-GSCI index returns, agricultural commodity prices are uncorrelated to stock 
market returns and oil prices. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that financial 
investors, and in particular commodity index traders, have played a significant role in linking 
agricultural prices to financial market dynamics and energy prices. Tables 4 and 5 summarize 
these results (obtained from weekly time-series but robust to the use of daily data). 
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 The unpublished paper focus on four main agricultural commodities traded on international markets (corn, Kansas City wheat, 
Chicago wheat, soybeans), while an earlier version (Girardi, 2012) examine only the case of Kansas City Wheat. 
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Source: Girardi, 2012b 
Figure 7. 250-days rolling correlation14 of the "four crops futures index15" with the US equity index S&P500 
(1970-2011) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Girardi (2012b) 
Figure 8. 250-days rolling correlation14 of the "four crops futures index4" with oil price16 (1986-2011) 
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   The rolling correlation (or moving correlation) is a linear correlation coefficient calculated over an initial subset of the series, in this 
case the first year of the sample, and then rolled forward over the entire sample. 
 
15
 Simple average of the futures prices of Chicago wheat, Kansas City wheat, soybean and corn. 
 
16
 We used the WTI front contract futures price, in order to have daily data 
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Table 4. Correlation between agricultural commodity prices and stock market returns (weekly) 
Partial regression coefficient for the regression of agricultural prices on stock market returns  
(Estimated through Garch (1,1)-t model) 
Period 1996-2006  2007-2011 
Control variables 
 
AR   AR  
US Dollar 
 AR  AR 
US Dollar 
R-Dummy  
 
AR 
US Dollar 
R-Dummy 
S&P-GSCI 
 
CORN 0.01 0.001  0.48*** 0.40*** 0.03 
WHEAT (CBOT) -0.03 -0.007  0.52*** 0.41*** 0.09 
WHEAT (KCBT) -0.05 -0.05  0.49*** 0.38*** 0.06 
SOYBEANS 0.02 0.008  0.55*** 0.43*** 0.13* 
Notes: Coefficients estimates are noted as significant at the 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels. Coefficients that are significantly different 
from 0 at the 5% level are noted in bold. All variables are expressed in first differences of the natural logarithm.  
 
 
Table 5. Correlation between agricultural commodity prices and Brent oil price (weekly) 
Partial regression coefficient for the regression of agricultural prices on Brent oil price  
(Estimated through Garch (1,1)-t model) 
Period 1996-2006  2007-2011 
Control variables 
 
AR   AR  
US Dollar 
 AR  AR 
US Dollar 
R-Dummy  
Gasoline Price 
 
AR 
US Dollar 
R-Dummy 
Gasoline Price 
S&P-GSCI 
 
CORN 0.02 0.01  0.33*** 0.30*** 0.05 
WHEAT (CBOT) 0.04 0.03  0.31*** 0.25*** 0.07 
WHEAT (KCBT) 0.04 0.03  0.28*** 0.23*** 0.05 
SOYBEANS 0.04* 0.03  0.37*** 0.30*** 0.11*** 
Notes: Coefficients estimates are noted as significant at the 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels. Coefficients that are significantly different 
from 0 at the 5% level are noted in bold. All variables are expressed in first differences of the natural logarithm.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
The economic and human costs of recent commodity price fluctuations have been dramatically 
high, with a strong negative worldwide impact on poverty and food security. I agree with Jayati 
Ghosh (2011) when she advocates the application of the precautionary principle on this matter. In 
the presence of some significant, if not conclusive, evidence that the growth of financial speculative 
transactions may have contributed to recent agricultural price fluctuations (UNCTAD, 2011; Tang 
and Xiong, 2010; Buyuksahin and Robe, 2010; IATP, 2011; Gilbert, 2009; Masters and White, 
2008; Girardi, 2012a and 2012b), it would be sensible for regulators to act to reverse the process 
of deregulation of commodity derivatives markets. Position limits should be increased again, and 
commodity index traders should not be exempted from them (as they have been since 1991). The 
jurisdiction of market authorities should be extended to OTC transactions, and to markets which 
are now almost completely unregulated (such as the ones in London). The Dodd-Frank act, 
recently approved in the US, is a step in this direction in that it provides for the centralization and 
16 
 
regulation of OTC and the application of position limits to index trading. It remains to be seen how 
it will be implemented by the US Market Authority (the CFTC). Moreover, coordination between 
market authorities, coupled with the imposition of analogous rules in all the main commodity 
exchanges, would be necessary to impede investors bypassing rules and limits simply by trading 
the same commodity on exchanges elsewhere.  
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